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ABSTRACT 
 
Hoping to contribute to the existing pool of literature, this paper examines the relationship 
between military expenditure and economic growth in selected Asian countries for the 
period 1989 to 2004. Our panel unit root test suggests that real GDP per capita and 
military expenditures are )1(I  processes, while the Larsson et al. (2001) panel 
cointegration test indicates that economic growth and military expendirues are 
cointegrated. Finally, applying the panel error-correction technique proposed by Pesaran et 
al. (1999), our empirical results show that defense spending and economic growth in the 
Asian countries under the period of study are not related. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Is defense spending related to economic growth? This question has important implication 
for policy makers and researchers. For the policy makers, the impact of military 
expenditure on economic growth which can be positive or negative can have different 
ramification with respect to what strategy to take to foster growth. A positive relationship 
                                                 
1,2
Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Management, Universiti Putra Malaysia, 43400 
UPM Serdang, Selangor, Malaysia. 
3
Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Business 
Universiti Malaysia Sarawak 94300 Kota Samarahan, Sarawak, Malaysia.  
*
Coresponding author. Tel.: +603-89467635. Fax.: +603-89467665. Email addresses: 
muzafar@econ.upm.edu.my (M.S.Habibullah), lawsh@econ.upm.edu.my (S.H.Law),  
amdaffizah@feb.unimas.my (A.M.Dayang-Affizzah).  
 
 1 
between defense spending and growth and the line of causation that runs from defense 
spending to economic growth implies that defense spending stimulate economic growth. 
In this respect defense spending enhances aggregate demand by increasing purchasing 
power and produces positive spin-off effect. DeGrasse (1993) argues that defense 
spending generates contract awards which generate jobs and increase purchasing power of 
workers. The increased purchasing power will lead to more demand. Thus, through this 
process of increasing aggregate demand and employment, defense spending helps 
economic growth. On the other hand, Deger (1986) points out that in the less developing 
countries (LDCs), military may help in creating a socioeconomic structure conducive to 
growth. In this aspect, military may engage in research and development, provide 
technical skills, educational training and create an infrastructure necessary for economic 
development. With respect to negative impact of military expenditure on growth, 
economists focus on the opportunity cost of military spending, that is military 
expenditures hinder economic development by reducing savings and misallocating 
resources away from more productive use in the public or private sector (see Deger, 1986; 
Deger and Smith, 1983).  
 
From the viewpoint of the researchers, the question of whether military spending Granger 
cause economic growth or otherwise has important implication for empirical work. Using 
annual data on 57 LDCs, Joerding (1986) found out that economic growth Granger cause 
military spending but found no evidence that military spending Granger cause economic 
growth. Joerding (1986) conclude that military spending potentially is an endogenous 
variable and consequently this has important econometric implication when estimating an 
equation with military spending as one of the independent variable. Ades and Chua (1997) 
provides a good example for the endogeneity of military expenditure. Ades and Chua 
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(1997) argue that regional instability has a strong positive influence on military spending 
and they found that military outlays respond more to outside rather than to inside threats. 
Countries devoting large resources to military buildup are likely to force a similar 
response among its neighbours, a reaction necessary to deter potential future military 
aggressions. Examples of this “ratcheting effect” abound among countries in the Middle 
East, between North and South Korea, and among Argentina, Chile and Brazil during the 
1970s and 1980s. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to determine empirically whether military spending is 
related to economic growth in selected Asian economies. The Asian countries selected are 
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Our paper contributes to the present literature on 
defense spending-economic growth by applying the panel error-correction model proposed 
by Pesaran et al. (1999) to concur causality in a panel data framework between military 
expenditure and economic growth. The plan of the paper is as follow. In the next section 
we review related empirical work on the defense spending-economic growth nexus. In 
section 3, we provide the method of estimation and in section 4, we discuss the empirical 
results. The last section contains our conclusion. 
 
 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
 
Since the pioneering seminal work by Benoit (1973, 1978), the results of a large volume of 
empirical work on the military expenditure-economic growth nexus is at best mixed. In 
contrast to the popular notion that military spending retard growth, the results of a positive 
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impact of military spending on economic growth in developing countries found by Benoit 
(1978) has resulted in an explosion of research interest in this topic. Numerous studies has 
been conducted on both the developed and developing countries, and using both cross-
section and time-series data and various techniques from simple OLS to more 
sophisticated VECM approach (see for example Benoit, 1978; Deger, 1986; Karagol and 
Palaz, 2004; Dakurah et al., 2001; Kollias et al., 2004). 
 
Nevertheless, the discussions and empirical evidence on the causal link between defense 
spending and economic growth has resulted into several competing hypotheses. First, is 
the bi-directional causal relationship between military spending and economic growth. The 
feedback relationship implies that defense spending causes economic growth and 
economic growth causes higher defense spending (Kusi, 1994). Second, is unidirectional 
causality running from military expenditure to growth. This relationship indicate the 
presence of aggregate demand and employment effects that to a large extent may be 
attributed to domestic arms production and spin-offs from military research and 
development (Benoit, 1973, 1978; Deger, 1986). Third, is unidirectional causality running 
from economic growth to military spending. This relationship can be interpreted as an 
indication that countries are trying to protect their wealth and people from external threats 
(see Kollias et al., 2004). Finally is the view that indicates that there is no relationship 
between defense spending and economic growth (Biswas and Ram, 1986; Grobar and 
Porter, 1989).  
 
There are numerous studies that commensurate to the above four possible outcomes. For 
example Dakurah et al. (2001) show that unidirectional causality running from military 
expenditure to growth was found in 10 countries, from economic growth to military 
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expenditure in 13 countries, while bi-directional causality existed in 7 countries. Causality 
did not exist in 18 countries that were integrated of the same order, while in 14 countries 
the data were integrated of differing orders. On the other hand, a study by Joerding (1986) 
on 57 LDCs found Granger causality that runs from economic growth to spending 
expenditure but not otherwise. Study on the Arab Gulf region by Al-Yousif (2002) show 
mixed results. For Saudi Arabia, the causality is positive and runs from defense spending 
to economic growth. By contrast in Iran and Kuwait, defense spending leads to lower 
economic growth. The results for Bahrain indicate that defense spending leads to 
economic growth, while in the UAE, there is a bi-directional causality between defense 
spending and economic growth. However, in Oman, defense spending and economic 
growth do not seem to be related. 
 
Other studies that contribute to the above debate on military spending-economic growth 
nexus include among others; Kusi (1994), Chowdhury (1991), Frederiksen and LaCivita 
(1987), Frederiksen (1991), Rahman (2000), Lai et al. (2005), Khilji and Mahmood (1997), 
Chang et al. (2000), LaCivita and Frederiksen (1991), and Chen (1993). Since the present 
paper addressed the issue of the presence and direction of causality between military 
expenditure and economic growth in the case of selected Asian countries, we show in 
Table 1 the results of the four outcomes of the above literature with respect to the Asian 
countries under study.  
 
[insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Several interesting observation we can derive from Table 1. First, only in the cases of 
Indonesia and Bangladesh that we found that the results are consistent. Bangladesh 
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indicate economic growth causal effect military expenditure, while on the other hand, 
Indonesia suggest that military expenditure causal effect economic growth. Second, for 
other countries, result of direction of causation differs with different studies. The lack of 
consensus on the direction of causation between defense spending and growth can be due 
to the non-stationary of the time-series variables used in the analysis. According to 
Granger and Newbold (1974), both the use of non-stationary variables and the neglect of 
possible long-run relationships make regression results biased and reliable. Despite one 
addressed the issue of stationarity, one common criticism raised in the literature is that of 
the low testing power of the conventional unit root and cointegration tests. Therefore, in 
this study, to overcome the shortcomings of the conventional unit root and cointegration 
tests, we advocate in using the Panel Autoregressive Distributed Lag (PARDL) framework 
in line with Pesaran et al. (1999) to infer the direction of causation between military 
expenditure and economic growth in a group of Asian countries. Two recently developed 
methods for statistical analysis of dynamic panel data, namely the Mean Group (MG) and 
the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimations were employed in this study. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Since the annual data available in our study ranges from 1989 to 2004 (16 observations), 
the short time dimension of the available data on a country level hinders robust estimates 
with classical time-series econometrics. Panel econometrics are said to allow a substantial 
gain in power and furthermore, panel estimators are proven to deal better with the problem 
of measurement bias (Baltagi et al., 1995). Pesaran et al. (1999) propose the Pool Mean 
Group (PMG) estimator which is essentially a dynamic error-correction model that allows 
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the short-run parameters to vary across countries (Groups), while restricting long-run 
elasticities to be identical across countries.  An alternative technique, the Mean group 
(MG) estimator, also discussed in Pesaran et al. (1999) involves simply the estimation of 
separate equations for each country and the computation of the mean estimates, without 
imposing any constraint on the parameters. However, if some parameters are the same 
across groups, efficiency gains are made by taking this into account.  
 
To illustrate the method, we start with the following long-run relationship with say, 
tGrowth  denotes economic growth and tMExp  denotes military expenditures 
 
ititiiit MExpGrowth   10        (1) 
 
For simplicity, assuming a maximum lag order of one, we can re-write Equation (1) as an 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) (1,1) as follows 
 
ittiitiiitiitit GrowthMExpMExpGrowth    1,1,1110    (2) 
 
The subscripts 12...,,2,1i  stand for 12 Asian countries, the subscripts 2004...,,1990,1989t  
for the years 1989 to 2004, i  represent the fixed effects due to the parameter i0 , and i  
are the coefficients of the explanatory variables and i  the coefficients of the lagged 
dependent variable. 
 
Rewriting Equation (2) in an error-correction form yields 
 
itititiitiiit MExpMExpGrowthGrowth    11101, )(    (3) 
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Imposing the same long-run coefficients in Equation (1) implies that in the long-run the 
elasticities of economic growth with respect to military expenditures will be the same 
across countries. The long-run causality between defense spending and economic growth 
can be infer from the sign and the significant of the error-correction term i . A significant 
and negative sign of i  suggest that military expenditures causal effect economic growth. 
Country heterogeneity is accounted for by allowing different short-run dynamics in each 
cross sectional unit. 
 
Pesaran et al.(1999) point out that three econometric techniques seem to be suitable to 
estimate ARDL models such as Equation (2): Mean Group (MG), Pooled Mean Group 
(PMG) and Dynamic Fixed effects (DFE). With both T , the number of time-series 
observations, and N , the number of groups, quite large, all three methods produce 
consistent estimates of the coefficients, though these estimates will be inefficient (and 
biased) when specific homogeneity assumptions hold. The MG estimator is consistent and 
imposes no restrictions at all, and thus provides a standard of comparison. The traditional 
pooled estimators such as the DFE constraint the coefficients and the error variances to be 
the same across groups. Only the intercepts are allowed to differ from group to group. 
These estimators may cause substantial efficiency losses when only long-run homogeneity 
assumptions are valid. The PMG has the advantage over the DFE and the MG model in 
that the short-run dynamics (and the error variances) are allowed to differ freely while the 
long-run slope coefficients are assumed to be equal across groups.  
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The test of the homogeneity of the long-run coefficients is provided by a Hausman test. 
This is based on the null hypothesis that the two set of coefficients generated by the PMG 
and MG estimators are not statistically different. Under the null hypothesis this statistic is 
asymptotically distributed as a ,)(2 p  where p  is the number of parameters. The lag 
order of the ARDL model for each country covered is selected by the Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion (SBC) subject to a maximum lag of two. Based on these SBC determined lag 
orders long-run homogeneity is imposed. 
 
 
Sources of data 
 
In this study we use annual data that span from 1989 to 2004. The Asian countries 
included in the study are Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Data on share of military 
expenditure to gross domestic product and real gross domestic product per capita are 
collected the World Development Indicator database. All variables were transformed into 
natural logarithm. 
 
 
DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Test for panel unit root 
 
Before testing for causality between economic growth and military expenditure using the 
panel error-correction approach, it is essential to determine the order of integration for 
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each of the series. The popular standard ADF tests used to test for the presence of unit 
roots has been criticised for lack of power. Some authors recognised that the power could 
be significantly improved if panel data are used instead of a univariate time-series (Levin 
et al., 2002; Im et al., 1997). Furthermore, the panel approach appears extremely appealing 
because the inclusion of a limited amount of cross-sectional information induces 
significant improvement in term of power. For the panel unit root test procedures, Levin et 
al. (2002) proposed to perform the augmented Dickey-Fuller tests based on the following 
regression model. For a sample of N  groups observed over T  time periods, the panel unit 
root regression of the ADF test is written as 
 
 


ip
j
itjitijitiiit TtNiyyy
1
1 ,...,1,,...,1,    (4) 
 
where ijii and  ,  are parameters and the error terms it  are uncorrelated across regions. 
The Levin-Lin-Chu tests for the 0:0 iH   against 0: iaH  . Under the null hypothesis, 
they show that the test statistics, *t  is asymptotically distributed according to the standard 
normal distribution.  
 
On the other hand, Im et al. (1997) extent the work of Levin et al. (2002) to allow for 
heterogeneity in the value of i  in Equation (4). Im et al. (1997) proposed a t bar statistic, 
which is based on the average of the individual ADF t statistics.  
 
The null hypothesis of a unit root in the panel data is defined as  
 
,0i  for all i          (5) 
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against the alternatives that all series are stationary processes  
 
i <0, ;,...,2,1 1Ni   ,0i  NNNi ,...,2,1 21  .     (6) 
 
This equation of the alternative hypothesis allows for 0  i  for all .i  To test the 
hypothesis, Im et al. (1997) propose a standardised t bar statistic given by 
 
     
     
 



N
i iiTi
N
i iiTiNT
t
ptVarN
ptENtN
1 ,
1 ,
00,/1
00,/1


     (7) 
 
where 
 
   iiTiNT pt
N
t ,
1
,         (8) 
 
and  iiTi pt ,,  is the individual t statistic for testing 0i  for all .i    00,, iiTi ptE   
and   00,, iptVar iTi   are reported in Table 2 of Im et al. (1997). Under the null 
hypothesis, the standardised t bar statistic t  is asymptotically distributed as a standard 
normal distribution ( t ~  1,0N ). The Im et al. (1997) panel unit root test is derived 
assuming that the series are independently generated, and they suggested subtracting 
cross-sectional means to remove common time specific effects. This assumes the error 
term in Equation (8) consists of two random components, ittit    where it  is the 
idiosyncratic random component, and t  is a stationary time-specific effect that accounts 
for correlation in the errors across economies. 
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Another commonly used panel unit root test is the one based on Fisher (1932). Maddala 
and Wu (1999) propose the test statistic which is based on combining the p-values of the 
test statistics (of i) of N independent ADF regressions. The test statistic (the Fisher test 
P()) is as follows 
 
    

N
i
iP
1
log2          (9) 
 
where i  is the p-value of the test statistic for unit .i  The Fisher test statistic  P  is 
distributed as a chi-squared distribution with 2N degree of freedom.  
 
The result for the panel of unit root test for GDP and Military Expenditures are presented 
in Table 2. We report the estimated t-star statistics of the Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) test, t bar 
statistics for the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test and  -values for the Fisher )(P  test with 
their accompanying p-values. Despite study by Im et al. (1997) that have demonstrated by 
Monte Carlo simulations that their panel test suggest better finite sample performance of 
the t  over Levin-Lin-Chu’s 
*t , and a study by Breitung (1999) that has showed the 
Maddala and Wu (1999) panel unit root tests have considerable more power relative to the 
IPS test, in all cases the three panel unit root test results are consistent indicating that real 
GDP per capita and military expenditures are )1(I  as a group. The null hypothesis of unit 
root in levels cannot be reject at the 5 percent level of significance, while the null 
hypothesis of a unit root at in first difference can be reject at the 5 percent level of 
significance. 
 
 12 
[insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Test for panel cointegration 
 
Having determined that both series are integrated of order one, that is, they are )1(I  
processes; we proceed for the testing of panel cointegration. In this study we employ 
Larsson et al. (2001) panel cointegration test approach. Larsson et al. (2001) develop the 
test based on Johansen’s (1988) multivariate cointegration framework. Given N  countries 
with time dimension T  and a set of )1(Ip  variables, we estimate the Johansen 
heterogenous vector error-correction model (VECM) for each country N , using the 
maximum likelihood method and then the trace statistic iLR , is calculated. The null 
hypothesis for heterogenous panels is that all N  countries have the same number of 
cointegrating vectors )( ir  among the p  variables, that is, ,)(:0 prankH i   for all Ni ...,,1  
(where i  is the long-run matrix of order ).pxp  
 
The panel cointegration rank trace test, ,LR  is obtained by calculating the average of the 
N  individual trace statistics NTLR  and then standardizing it: 
 
)1,0(
)var(
)]([
N
Z
ZELRN
k
kNT
LR 

       (10) 
 
where )( kZE  and )var( kZ  are respectively the mean and variance of the asymptotic trace 
statistic obtained by Larsson et al. (2001). The results of the Larsson et al. panel 
cointegration test are given in Table 3. The estimates of the trace statistics indicate that 
nine countries reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. However, the panel 
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cointegration rank trace statistic shown at the bottom of Table 3, strongly rejects the null 
of no cointegration and suggest that 1r  is the largest rank in the panel. Therefore the 
Larsson et al. panel test favours the existence of one common cointegrating vector among 
the variables in the panel; it suggests that there appears to be a long-run equilibrium 
relationship relating economic growth and military expenditures in all countries. 
 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Test for long-run causality 
 
Our main purpose is to determine the causal direction between defense spending and 
economic growth in the Asian countries. In a panel setting we have employed the Pesaran 
et al. (1999) panel error-correction model approach which uses two estimators, that is the 
PMG and MG estimators. One important advantage of PMG over MG or the traditional 
dynamic fixed effect model is that the short-run dynamics (and the error variances) are 
allowed to differ freely while the long-run slope coefficients are assumed to be equal 
across groups. Due to similar levels of economic and technological development (except 
for Japan), but differences in institutional infrastructure and cultural, we expected that the 
long-run equilibrium relationships between fundamental variables is similar across the 
Asian countries, with the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium values differing 
freely country by country. Using the panel error-correction model, the cultural and 
institutional specifics of a country which usually drive short-term dynamics can be 
properly accounted for. 
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Table 4 presents the estimates of the long-run coefficients of equation (3) based on the 
estimators PMG and MG. The results are based on lag orders for each country chosen by 
the Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion (SBC) subject to a maximum lag of 1. Then, 
using these SBC – determined lag orders, and after imposing homogeneity restriction, the 
dynamic heterogenous panel equation (3) was estimated using maximum likelihood. The 
estimates are computed with the Newton-Raphson algorithm, which uses both the first and 
the second derivatives of the likelihood function. 
 
[insert Table 4 about here] 
 
In Table 4, in order to test for the robustness of the estimates, we have presented the 
estimates of PMG and MG with and without Japan. The economic rational doing this is 
that Japan is a developed nation and therefore, we expect that Japan behave differently 
from the rest of the developing countries in the sample. In Panel A, we present the results 
where economic growth act as the dependent variable, while in Panel B, military 
expenditures act as the dependent variables. Under each panel, the first estimated equation 
is where we estimate all country, while in the second equation we exclude Japan. In Table 
4 we also show the Hausman test for determining any statistical differences between PMG 
and MG. 
 
In this study, we are interested in determining the significance of the error-correction term 
in order to infer long-run causality between economic growth and defense spending. First, 
the joint Hausman test statistics clearly indicate that the restriction of long-run 
homogeneity of all long-run coefficients cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level of 
significance for estimated equation with economic growth as dependent variables for both 
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samples – with and without Japan; and the sample without Japan for estimated equation 
with military expenditures as dependent variable. This indicates that the difference 
between MG and PMG estimates is not significant. This implies that the long-run 
relationship between economic growth and defense spending is equal across the Asian 
countries. However, only in the case of estimated equation without Japan with military 
expenditures as the dependent variable that the Hausman test is statistically significance at 
the 5 percent level. 
 
Next we observe for the significance of the error-correction term to infer long-run 
causality between the two variables. As shown in Table 4, our results strongly suggest that 
the null hypothesis that there is no long-run causality in either direction cannot be rejected 
at the 5 percent level. This implies that defense spending and economic growth in the 
Asian countries are independent. Our result is consistent with earlier finding in Biswas and 
Ram (1986) and Chowdhury (1991). Biswas and Ram (1986) found 80 percent of the 
countries in their study does not show any present of statistical significant relationship 
between defense spending and economic growth, while Chowdhury (1991) found 55 
percent of the countries show no relationship between the two variables. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This study made an attempt to examine the long-run relationship and the causal direction 
between military expenditures and economic growth in twelve Asian countries, namely; 
Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, 
South Korea, Sri Lanka and Thailand. We use annual data for the period 1989 to 2004. We 
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applied the three panel unit root test due to Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (1997) and Maddala and Wu (1999) for the testing of the order of integration; using 
the Larsson, Lyhagen and Lothgren (2001) panel cointegration test for the testing of long-
run relationship between defense spending and economic growth; and we employed the 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) panel error-correction model to infer long-run causality 
between the two variables. 
 
Our results clearly indicate that time-series defense spending and economic real GDP per 
capita are integrated of order one as a group. Our panel cointegration result suggest that 
the two macro-variables are cointegrated that is there is long-run relationship between 
military expenditures and economic growth. Lastly, our panel error-correction model 
indicates strongly that defense spending and economic growth is not related in the Asian 
countries under study, although the sample has been test for the absence/present of Japan. 
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Table 1: Summary of Results of Causation between Military Expenditure (Mexp) and 
Economic Growth (Growth) for Selected Asian Countries 
 
Author(s) Direction of causality 
Mexp  Growth Growth  Mexp Mexp  Growth Independent 
     
Chen (1993) - - - China 
     
LaCivita and 
Frederiksen (1991) 
Thailand Sri Lanka Pakistan Philippines 
India 
     
Khilji and 
Mahmood (1997) 
- - Pakistan - 
     
Chang et al. (2000) - China - - 
     
Rahman (2000) - Bangladesh - - 
     
Frederiksen (1991) Indonesia 
Singapore 
Malaysia Thailand South Korea 
Philippines 
     
Frederiksen (1987) - Philippines - - 
     
Chowdhury (1991) Indonesia 
South Korea 
Philippines 
Thailand 
 - Malaysia 
     
Lai et al. (2005) China - - - 
     
Kusi (1994) Indonesia 
South Korea 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Bangladesh - India 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
     
 
Notes: Symbols  and  denote unidirectional and bi-directional respectively. 
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Table 2: Results of Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
Series 
 
Levin-Lin-Chu test , 
*t
a
 
Im-Pesaran-Shin test, 
t
a
 
Maddala-Wu test,  
P()b 
    
A. Level    
    
GDP -1.50 (0-2) 2.02 (0-2) 20.63 (0-2) 
 [0.06] [0.97] [0.66] 
    
MExp -0.99 (0-2) 0.79 (0-2) 20.69 (0-2) 
 [0.16] [0.78] [0.65] 
    
    
B. First difference    
    
GDP -7.84 (0-3) -6.54 (0-3) 85.71 (0-3) 
 [0.00]* [0.00]* [0.00]* 
    
MExp -8.94 (0-1) -6.93 (0-1) 88.17 (0-1) 
 [0.00]* [0.00]* [0.00]* 
    
    
 
Notes: 
a
Under the null hypothesis, the standardised t bar statistic t  (the IPS test statistic) is 
asymptotically distributed as a standard normal distribution. Lag length chosen is based on SIC which is 
automatically selected by EViews5.1. The numbers in parentheses denote the range of lag length and those 
in square brackets are p-values. The p-values are estimated from the one-tail test of the standardised normal 
distribution. 
b
Under the null hypothesis, the Fisher test statistic P() is distributed as a chi-squared 
distribution with 2N degree of freedom. Lag length chosen is based on the basis of SIC automatically 
selected by EViews5.1. The p-values are estimated from a chi-squared distribution with 2N degree of 
freedom. Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significance at 1% level. 
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Table 3: Larsson et al. (2001) Panel Cointegration Tests 
 
Country-by-country tests 
  )2()( HrHLRCT   
Country lag  0r  1r  )(rRank  
     
Bangladesh 1 16.17* 0.74 1 
     
China 1 16.32* 0.46 1 
     
India 2 21.44* 0.26 1 
     
Indonesia 3 11.71 0.49 0 
     
Japan 1 16.18* 1.83 1 
     
South Korea 1 16.26* 0.00 1 
     
Malaysia 1 10.47 3.57 0 
     
Philippines 1 16.73* 2.52 1 
     
Pakistan 1 7.88 0.05 0 
     
Singapore 1 16.64* 2.49 1 
     
Sri Lanka 3 18.46* 0.39 1 
     
Thailand 3 17.48* 2.42 1 
     
     
Avg(TR)  15.47 1.26  
)( kZE   6.08 1.13  
)(var kZ   10.53 2.21  
LR   3.77* 0.97  
     
     
 
Notes: Trace statistics (with unrestricted intercepts and no trend in the vector autoregression) are reported for 
individual countries. The 5% critical values are 15.49 for r=0 (against the alternative 1r ) and 3.84 for 
1r  (against the alternative r=2). The critical values for )( kZE  and )(var kZ  are obtained from Larsson 
et al. (2001: Table 1). The panel rank test has a critical values of 1.645 (5%) and 2.326 (1%). 
 
 
 22 
 
Table 4: PMG and MG Estimates for Causality between Growth and Military 
Expenditures 
 
 Pooled MG MG Joint Hausman test 
Coef St. Er t-ratio Coef St. Er t-ratio h-test p-values 
         
A. Dependent variable: Economic growth    
         
1. Long-run coefficient (All Asian countries)      
    MExp 0.084 0.184 0.456 0.487 0.608 0.802 0.48 0.49 
         
   Error Correction Coefficient      
    Phi -0.039 0.023 -1.711 -0.049 0.028 -1.740   
         
         
2. Long-run coefficient (Asian without Japan)      
    MExp 0.123 0.196 0.628 0.594 0.656 0.906 0.57 0.45 
         
   Error Correction Coefficient      
    Phi -0.033 0.023 -1.394 -0.047 0.031 -1.526   
         
         
B. Dependent variable: Military expenditures    
         
1. Long-run coefficient (All Asian countries)      
    Growth -2.886 0.293 -9.864* -1.439 0.766 -1.877 4.18* 0.04 
         
   Error Correction Coefficient      
    Phi -0.154 0.089 -1.734 -0.264 0.080 -3.316*   
         
         
2. Long-run coefficient (Asian without Japan)      
    Growth -2.899 0.295 -9.841* -1.555 0.830 -1.874 3.00 0.08 
         
   Error Correction Coefficient      
    Phi -0.166 0.096 -1.728 -0.279 0.086 -3.255*   
         
         
 
Notes: Asterisk (*) denotes statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
